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Abstract 
This study measures the impact of a flood in 2010 in Benin on children’s schooling and labor. 
The data used are the National Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) of 2006 and 2012. The 
difference in differences estimates points out a significant decrease in income between farm 
households and non-farm households following the shock. Enrollment has also significantly 
decreased by 5.99% for girls in rural areas, by 4.45% for boys in rural areas, by 7.76% for girls in 
urban areas and by 6.17% for boys in urban areas. The likelihood to be a domestic worker or a 
farmer has also significantly increased. Robustness checks, on different other groups, are in 
concordance with the results. Despite the removal of school fees in 2006, households still 
withdrew their children from school after this income shock. These results imply that income 
shocks could be a threat to the Universal Primary Education. 
Keywords: Natural disasters, Education, Income shock, Child labor. 
JEL classification: I24, O55, Q54 
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1. Introduction 
In the last decade, many developing countries have launched policies to reach the goal of 
Education for All. The policies aimed to promote children’s education and to decrease gender  
and income inequalities. Despite the enhancement of education on many levels, the income 
disparities appear to be persistent. In Sub-Saharan African countries, a recent report on the 
Millenium Development Goals points out that enrollment in primary schools has more than 
doubled between 1990 and 2012, but only 23% of girls in poor households, do complete their 
primary education (United Nation, 2014). It raises the question of the importance of household 
income in schooling decisions. Moreover, could educational policies influence parents’ schooling 
decisions in case of income shocks? 
In this framework, many authors considered the relationship between parental income and 
children’s schooling. They revealed that the income effect is potentially biased because of 
measurement errors and endogeneity. Both income and children’s education are associated with 
unobserved family abilities. It could explain the negligible impact of parental income on 
education (Behrman and Knowles, 1999). It is thus necessary to use an instrument to separate the 
effects of income and abilities. The researches on household income and education could be 
presented in two groups according to the type of shocks observed: idiosyncratic shocks, at the 
household level, and mesoeconomic or macroeconomic, at the community or nation level. In the 
first group, Maurin (2002) disentangled the effects of income from the unobservable parents’ 
abilities with variables on grandparents and parents in France. The author found that the 
probability of repeating grades in the early stages of education is affected by the parents’ level of 
income. Beegle et al. (2006) discovered in Tanzania that transitory income shocks increase child 
labor and decrease enrollment. However, the household assets might help mitigate the shocks. 
Kazianga (2012) also established that uncertainty in household’s income leads to the decrease in 
enrollment and completed years of schooling as risk coping strategies. The second group 
examined the impact of macroeconomic income shocks on households' schooling and labor 
decisions. Cogneau and Jedwab (2008) uses the cut in cocoa price in 1990 to compare schooling 
decisions in cocoa family and others agriculture families before and after the crisis. The authors 
indicated a strong and significant causal relationship of parental income on enrollment, labor and 
health. In Burkina Faso, the drop in income of food crop farmers in comparison to cotton farmers 
in the mid nineties induced a decreased in children’s enrollment as well (Grimm, 2011). 
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Björkman-Nyqvist (2013) also concludes that the rainfalls’ deviations from their long-term mean 
have a significant negative impact on girls’ enrollment despite the elimination of costs in Uganda. 
The shocks also influenced girls’ test scores and not boys. This research belongs to the last trend 
of studies.  
Furthermore, one study in particular has questioned the role of cash transfer as safety nets for 
children's education in developing countries. De Janvry et al. (2006) examines the role of the 
cash transfers as safety nets for children when the households are submitted to income shocks. In 
situation of income shocks, the authors discovered that households increased child labor, but did 
not withdraw their children from schools. Indeed, the possibility to receive cash out of the child’s 
enrollment stopped the parents from withdrawing their children from school.  
Therefore, this paper investigates the impact of negative income shock on enrollment and 
child labor in a setting of free primary education (FPE). The question is whether an elimination of 
school fees could help parents smooth the impacts of income shocks and thus refrain them from 
withdrawing their children from school. A policy of elimination of school fees does not provide 
as much benefit as a cash transfer. It is, however, a non-negligible relief for the household’s 
budget. The elimination of school fees might encourage them to use different strategies in 
combining schooling and labor that will prevent them from withdrawing their children from 
school. Nevertheless, in some countries, parents still have to pay for other fees like uniform fees, 
books and other stationeries, that could sustain the income inequalities. Hence, it is necessary to 
measure the impact of an income shock after or during the implementation of the FPE. 
An interesting case study is Benin. It is a small West African country with agriculture as a 
predominant economic activity. Approximately 47% of the active population work in agriculture 
(INSAE, 2012 (2)). Two types of crops are cultivated: cereals crops (maize, millet, beans, etc.) 
and industrial crops (cotton, groundnuts, palm nuts…). In October 2006 Benin launched, a policy 
of elimination of school fees for primary school aged children. The gross enrollment rate went 
from 94.7% in 2005 to 104.27% in 2008 (INSAE, 2012). The Demographic and Health Survey 
(DHS) of Benin of 2006 indicates that 88.3% of the population among the poorest  and 27.8% 
among the richest had no formal education. For 2012, according to the DHS, 56.9% of the 
poorest and 7.0% of the richest had no formal education (INSAE, 2007, 2013). These statistics 
show that enrollment might have improved, but the income dissimilarities could still continue. In 
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2010, an important flood occurred in Benin, that might allow the analysis of the impact of 
negative income shocks after the launch of the FPE. An official report by the Global Facility for 
Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) in 2011 estimates the economic losses due to the 
shock to about 160 millions US dollars. Approximately 680,000 people were affected at different 
levels and 46 persons were killed. Given the importance of the shock, the government declared a 
state of emergency in October, 2010 (GFDRR, 2011). 
Consequently, the empirical strategies of this paper consider the positive rainfall deviation in 
2010 to estimate the causal impact of income on schooling. The data used are the National 
Demographic and Health Surveys of 2006 and 2012. Agricultural activities are more likely to be 
affected by the weather than other economic activities. Hence, the difference-in-differences 
compare children’s schooling and labor in farm and non-farm households before and after the 
shock. The outcomes analyzed are enrollment, domestic work, farm work and the combination of 
enrollment and work. The positive rainfall deviation  of 2010 induces a change in income 
between both groups of households. Due to this modification in income, diverse instrumental 
variable estimations can be performed to analyze the causal impact of household income on 
schooling. GDFRR (2011) also categorizes the country in affected and most affected 
municipalities. It is thus worth to examine the impacts of the weather shock on the most 
vulnerable. The robustness checks control the impact of the flood on farm households in affected 
and most affected municipalities.  In addition, a placebo experiment was performed on non-farm 
and not affected households.  
The relevance of the present research lies in the analysis of the relationship between price and 
income effects. These effects are observed through the potential reactions of households to 
income or price changes. An elimination of school fees could cause an improvement in children’s 
education which is the price effect. A negative income shock could generate a deterioration in 
children’s education which is the income effect. In the particular case of Benin, it could be of 
interest to determine which effect is predominant. Does the income effect prevail over the price 
effect? In such a case, an income shock, during the implementation of the school fees’ removal 
could result in a decrease in children’s education. Does the price effect overrule the income 
effect? In that case, an income shock, during the implementation of the elimination of school 
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fees, could result in a negligible or no influence on children’s education. In any case, it could 
indicate which policy to prioritize in order to enhance education. 
The structure of the paper is the following: Section 2 presents rainfall shocks in Benin; In 
section 3  the link between household income and the weather shock is analyzed. In section 4 the 
impact of the shock on schooling and labor is questioned. In  section 5 the causal impact of 
income of children’s schooling is explored. Section 6 displays the robustness checks, and section 
7 presents the main conclusions.  
 
2. Rainfall shocks in Benin 
Benin has a tropical wet and dry climate with variations in weather from the north to the south. 
There is a dry and a rainy season, the duration of which fluctuates depending on the different 
regions of the country. In the coastal region, four seasons can be identified: two dry seasons and 
two rainy seasons, one after the other. Given the tropical nature of its climate, the country is 
subjected to a number of floods and droughts over the years. Particularly, GDFRR (2011) 
considered the flood of 2010 as one of the most devastating in the past years in West Africa. This 
section analyzes the positive and negative rainfalls in Benin during the last 30 years and explains 
the causes of the flood of 2010.  
The national meteorological department, of the “Agence pour la Sécurité de la Navigation 
Aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar (ASECNA)”, collects the rainfall data over six weather 
stations. The  weather stations are: Bohicon, Cotonou, Kandi, Natitingou, Parakou and Save. 
These data are gathered in annual reports called “ Tableaux de bord social” by the National 
Institute for Statisitics and Economic Analysis (INSAE). The database used in this section 
comprises the quantity of rainfall in millimeters per year and weather station from 1973 to 2012. 
The graph 1 below presents a scatter plot of the rainfall data per station.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Graph1: Scatterplots of rainfall data per station from 1973 to 2012 
 
Source: Author based on INSAE, 2012 
 
The aim of the paper is to explain the impact of income’s shocks on child labor and schooling. 
Therefore, it is necessary that the income shock be a random and unexpected shock. If the shock 
is expected, households would be able to anticipate and take decisions in order to cope with it. In 
the agricultural areas, for instance, by making more provisions that they would be able to use 
when difficult times occur. In that case, they might be no significant changes in their behavior. 
When the shock is unexpected, the usual insurance taken by the household prior to the shock 
might not be sufficient. The behaviors of the household under this constraint are the object of 
interest here.  
Overall, there seems to be no particular time pattern in the series that could indicate a 
correlation in the time series. The autocorrelogram of each series confirms there is no 
autocorrelation in the series. It denotes that there is not enough evidence to accept the hypothesis 
that the series are correlated over time. The rainfall data appear to be random. The Portemanteau 
test for white noise also rejected the hypothesis that the rainfall series are white noises. These 
remarks are important and necessary and mean that a positive or negative rainfall deviation in any 
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region of the country is completely random and unpredictable. As a result, the different tests 
indicate that the rainfall shocks in Benin are random and thus unanticipated. In addition, graph 2 
presents line charts of  series and their long term mean.  
 
Graph 2: Line charts of rainfall per station from 1973 to 2012 
 
Source: Author based on INSAE, 2012 
 
After the computation of the long term mean of each series, the differences of the series from 
their mean were calculated to obtain the deviation from the long term mean. Usually the weather 
shocks are not observed at the same time in the different regions of the country. A year of 
drought or flood noticed in one weather station might not be the same in another weather station. 
This could be explained by the variations in climate of the regions. However, in the years 1975, 
1978, 1979, 2004 and 2010, there were positive rainfall deviations in every region. One remark is 
the difference in intensity of the shock within the same year from a station to another. For 
instance, the long term means of the weather stations Bohicon, Cotonou and Natitingou are 
among the highest with 1110, 1282 and 1200 millimeters  respectively per year over the period 
1973-2012. In 2004, the deviations from the long term mean for these weather stations are 
18.78%, 10.25% and 11.04% respectively. Thus, the weather station with the highest rainfall 
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deviation changes from year to year. In 2004, the highest positive rainfall deviation is 
approximately 20% of the long term mean in the station Save. In 2010, the highest positive 
rainfall deviation is 44% in the station Cotonou. Some caution is necessary since there is no 
information on standards retained by ASECNA to define a year of flooding.  
The important rainfalls of 2010 in combination with other environmental and urban 
management issues made the government of Benin called for international assistance on October 
1
st
, 2010 (GFDRR, 2011). One of the specificities of the flood of 2010 is that instead of two rainy 
seasons separated by a dry season, the two rainy seasons occurred successively over eight 
months. It contributed to the overflowing of some rivers  like Oueme, Niger and Mono from their 
banks. Moreover, the rapid growth of the population in cities like Cotonou was not accompanied 
with a development of the system of drainage of used waters. In some agglomerations of 
Cotonou, people have built their houses in swamp, for example, that are not adequate for 
construction because of the particularity of the soil. These areas are among the first to be 
overflowed in the rainy season. Besides, the damages of the flood of 2010 were quite important: 
680,000 people were affected and 46 killed; 55,000 homes, 455 schools and 92 health centers 
were destroyed; crops and seeds lost. All these elements explain the interest of the study for the 
flood of 2010.    
 
3. Household income and the flood of 2010 
In the present section, the relationship between the flood of 2010 and household income is 
analyzed.  Beforehand, it is necessary to present the data and the strategies to identify the weather 
shock.  
 
3.1 Data 
The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of 2006 and 2012 are used. They are produced  by 
the National Institute for Statistics in collaboration with Macro international Inc. The databases 
covered at least 17,000 households in each year and are representative at three levels: district, 
municipality and cluster levels. Benin has 12 districts and  77 municipalities, according to the law 
97-028 of January 15
th
, 1999. The DHS contain socio-demographic and economic information on 
a sample of households drawn randomly from the clusters defined in the surveys. In order to have 
additional information on the household characteristics, two were composed with the different 
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datasets of the surveys: a database of children between six and 14 years old and a database of 
household heads only. The children’s database has then been merged with the household head 
database. The final sample covers approximately 45,491 children aged six to 14. The DHS 
surveys of 2006 and 2012 are the most complete and reliable databases available for Benin before 
and after the weather shock in 2010.  
 
3.2 Identification strategy 
The influence of the shock may change depending on the household area of residence. The 
precedent section 2 indicates that the amplitude of the weather shock fluctuates from a region to 
another. Therefore, the inundation may affect every household in different ways. Hence, a 
variation in the shock that could be used for the identification strategy is the dissimilarity in the 
location of the households. GFDRR (2011) pinpoints 55 municipalities as affected over the 77 
municipalities of the country. In addition, a map, drawn by the Regional office for West and 
Central Africa of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), categorizes 
three types of municipalities: the most affected, the less affected and the non-affected 
municipalities. From this different classification, the study retained two experiments. The first 
experiment compares children from six to 14 years old living in the affected municipalities to 
children of the same age living in the non-affected municipalities. The second experiment 
compares the outcomes of children from six to 14 years old in the most affected municipalities to 
the children in the other municipalities. The advantage of these experiments is that they consider 
a pre-established categorization of municipalities according to the damages caused by the flood 
of 2010. The disadvantage is that the sources of income are not considered. For instance, certain 
municipalities (e.g.. Urban municipalities) may have predominantly  people working in the 
tertiary sector of the economy. This sector also called the sector of services does not depend 
much on the weather. The workers get paid regardless of the weather conditions. It might be 
difficult to observe a change in the household income.  
Another plausible variation can be identified in the sources of income of the household. In fact, 
the agricultural sector is the most vulnerable to weather shocks. A drought or a flood may cause a 
loss of crops and reduction of the harvests. It can lead to a decrease in the household income. As 
such, the third experiment would consider the differences between farm and non-farm households 
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before and after the flood of 2010. The databases contain a variable on whether the household 
owns an agricultural land. The variable is collected in hectares of agricultural land. In other 
words, a household that owns a hectare of agricultural land could have farming as one of its 
sources of income. This variable serves as a criterion to define farm and non-farm households. 
The strong point of this strategy is that the sources of income are considered. Yet, there is not 
enough information in the DHS surveys to examine other sources of income. 
Another potential threat to these strategies is migration. There is a possibility that people move 
from an area to another, because of the flood. Section 2 indicates that houses have been 
destroyed. In that case, the changes in income to capture might not actually be for the concerned 
households, but for their hosts. The impact could  suffer from selection bias. It is thus necessary 
to control for migration. In the sample studied, for about 91% of the children the current place of 
residence is their place of birth. The sample can be limited to households that have not moved 
since the birth of their child. Hence, the municipality of birth of the children has been considered 
to create the treatment variable instead of the current place of residence. Hence, the treatment 
variable will be, for example, that the child was born in an affected municipality instead of the 
child living in an affected municipality. It helps controls for any migration effect.  
Another potential weakness to the strategies is the comparability of the sample before and after 
the flood. One important assumption of the impact evaluation methods is the comparability of the 
groups. The idea is that the outcomes of the treated and controls would follow parallel trend 
without the treatment, which is the income shock, here. As a solution, the propensity score 
matching method allows to control for any observed differences between the control and 
treatment groups before the shock. Hence, the propensity score matching method has been used 
to create propensity scores for children in the database of 2006 and merge them with the children 
in the database of 2012. The variable used to compute the scores is the treatment variable for 
experiment 1: the child place of birth is one of the affected municipality.  
Once the different issues taken care of, the difference-in-differences estimations would show 
the impact of the flood of 2010 on the different groups. The following table gives a glance at the 
samples: 
 
Table 1: Statistics of different treatment groups after matching 
[Table 1 here] 
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Table 1 denotes that the sample of experiment 3 is inferior to the samples of the two first 
experiments. The DHS surveys contain only one proxy of income which is the wealth index. It is 
a standardized index computed based on the household’s assets (Filmer and Pritchett, 1998). The 
wealth index reduces the number of non-responses or missing values on income in the surveys. It 
is approximately between -250,000 and 800,000. It is a proxy for long term wealth or permanent 
income. Mostly, households with a positive index are either in the middle or in the richer 
quintiles of wealth. The following graphs present charts of the household wealth index according 
to the each experiment. Graph 3 presents experiment 1 which is the comparison between affected 
and non-affected households. Graph 4 shows experiment 2 which is the comparison between 
most affected households and non-affected households. Graph 5 displays the experiment 3 which 
is the comparison between farm households and non-farm households. 
Graph 3: Development of households’ wealth index according to the experiment 1 (Affected and non-affected 
households) per year  and group 
 
Source: Author based on DHS 2006, 2012 
First of all, graph 3 indicates that the treatment and control groups, in 2006 before the flooding, 
have a similar distribution of wealth. Due to the propensity score matching, the groups are more 
comparable. The treatment group is the children born into households in affected municipalities 
and the control group the children born into households in non-affected municipalities. The left 
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tail suggests that the majority of the population is in the poor quintiles. Only a few households 
are among the richest.   
Secondly, in 2012, the distribution of wealth index seems more equitable than in 2006. The 
curve is still left-tailed but there are more households in the rich quintiles. This does not mean 
that income has increased in the population. It may rather signify that people are poorer but the 
distribution is more even. The wealth index is in CFA francs (Communauté Financière 
d’Afrique) the national currency.  One US Dollar equals 621.55 CFA francs on  April 13, 2015. 
In fact, the maximum of the wealth index in 2006 is 756,601 CFA francs (1271.27 US Dollars) 
against 370,786 CFA francs (596.55 US Dollars) in 2012. There is also a slight difference 
between the distribution of wealth index of treatment and control groups. The main difference of 
graph 4 to graph 3 is that households in the most affected municipalities seem to have less 
income than those in the other municipalities in 2012. Graph 3 and 4 also indicate that 
experiments on the affected and most affected municipalities might not be adequate because the 
difference in income of both groups is not really important.  
 
Graph 4: Development of households’ wealth index according to the experiment 2 (Most affected and non-affected 
households) per year and group  
 
Source: Author based on DHS 2006, 2012 
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Graph 5: Development of wealth index of households, according to experiment 3 (Farm and non-farm households) 
per year and group  
 
Source: Author based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
In experiment 3, the treated are children living in farm households, while the controls are 
children living in non-farm households. Graph 5 shows that the difference in income between 
both groups is more pronounced in 2012. The treated appear to have less income than the control 
after the flooding. Still, the different remarks on the link between household income and flooding 
should be further analyzed in the estimations. 
 
4. Impact of the flooding of 2010 on child schooling and labor 
4.1 The model  
In the model of human capital investment, income is likely to be endogenous. Income might be 
strongly linked with parental education. Parents with higher education have usually higher 
incomes than parents with lower levels of education. It is thus difficult to differentiate the effect 
of parent’s abilities from their income. The solution to separate income and abilities’ effects is to 
find a variable that affects income, but has no correlation with the error term of the equation on 
child’s schooling. This instrument could be the flooding of 2010. Section 4 presents the impact of 
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the income shock on the different groups and informs on the right instrument for the instrumental 
variable later on.   
To analyze the impact of the flooding on child labor and schooling, many variables have been 
retained: enrollment, domestic work, farm or family work, and the combination of enrollment and 
work. All those variables are binary variables. For instance the variable on enrollment takes 1 
when the child is enrolled in a primary school and 0 otherwise. A short term reaction to the shock 
could be withdrawing the children from school.  It could help the households cope with the shock 
by reducing their expenses. The DHS 2012 has been collected two years after the flood of 2010. 
That is not enough to capture a long term impact of the shock. It explains the reason for the 
retention of enrollment as indicator for education instead of years of schooling for example. 
Two types of labor are studied. The first type of labor, domestic work, refers to any activity 
performed by the child in the household as taking care of other household members, cooking or 
cleaning. The second type of labor concerns activities performed by the child to help its parent in 
a farm or a family business (eg. Retail). It is also possible that a child combined enrollment and 
domestic work or farm work. In the sample, 65.43% of children were enrolled. Among the 
children enrolled, 44.74% combined enrollment and domestic work, while 24.71% combined 
enrollment and farm work. Among the children not enrolled, 37.70% were domestic workers and 
42.19% were farm workers. Other types of work are not considered because the DHS surveys 
inform mainly on these two types of labor. Besides, farm work and domestic work might not be 
paid jobs, but could be an immediate response of the households to increase their income. Farm 
households could demand that the children work on the farm to add to the revenue of the 
households. The need for workers on farms is likely to be more important after a weather shock. 
Other households might want that their children stay at home to help rebuild the houses destroyed 
or take care of the ills. Consequently, the standard model to determine the impacts of the shock 
is:  
                                                                     (Equation 1) 
X is a set of child and household characteristics; Outcome represents enrollment, domestic 
work, farm work and the combination of both, as well as the proxy for income, the wealth index; 
year_2012 is a dummy variable that takes 1 when the year is 2012 and 0 otherwise; treatment is a 
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binary variable that equals 1 when the child belongs to one of the treatment groups and 0 
otherwise; the coefficients a are  constant parameters; u is the error term. The child and 
household characteristics are: child’s age, household head’s age, household head’s gender, 
household head’s education, the relationship with the head, the number of children under five 
years old in the household, the number of household members and district dummies. The wealth 
index is divided by 1000 for simplicity in the analysis. The linear estimations with the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) are run separately per child’s gender and area of residence (rural and urban). 
Most of the outcomes are not linear, but the OLS estimates will serve as a base to compare 
further estimations. The number of households that owns an agricultural land might be more 
important in rural areas than in urban’s. Children in rural areas could then be working more than 
those in urban areas. The impact might thus vary among those areas. Moreover, cultural 
considerations of parents about girls’ enrollment could be different in both areas. That is the 
reason why separate estimations have been performed according to the gender and area of 
residence.  
To retain a treatment variable as an instrument for household income, it is necessary that this 
variable be significant for income and have a significant influence on enrollment mainly through 
the income’s effect. The previous models have been estimated for each experiment. Experiments 
1 and 2 are dropped because the treatment variables have no significant effect on income. Being a 
child born in one of the affected or the most affected municipalities has no significant influence 
on the household’s income. It means that the mere classification in municipalities after the flood 
of 2010 does not yield enough variations in income and cannot be used as instruments. On the 
contrary, the treatment variable of experiment 3 has a significant impact on income after the 
flood of 2010. Only this last variable has been presented as an instrument for income in the 
succeeding sections.  
 
4.2 Impact of the flood of 2010 on household income 
To obtain the impact of the flood of 2010 on farm households, equation 1 with the treatment 
variable of experiment 3 has been estimated. Treatment 3 consists of comparing outcomes of 
children living in farm and non-farm households before and after the inundation. Mainly, the 
estimations reveal a significant decrease in income for farm households in 2012. Table 2 shows 
the linear regressions of the outcomes for children in rural areas with experiment 3.   
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Table 2 and 2bis: Linear regressions of outcomes and income for children in rural areas for the period 2006-2012 
with the experiment 3 
[Table 2 here] 
In the column on wealth of table 2, the statistics imply that income increases with the level of 
education. Indeed, there is a negative association between having a household head with no 
formal education or a primary education and the index of wealth in 2006.  There is also a 
difference in remuneration between rural and urban areas. While in rural areas, a household 
whose heads have no formal education earns  60,000 CFA francs (96.53 US dollars) less than the 
highly educated head, in urban areas, a household whose head had no formal education earns 
140,000 CFA francs (225.24 US dollars) The dissimilarities notice between urban and rural areas 
could be explained by better job opportunities in urban areas than in rural. Qualified workers 
could be better remunerated in urban than in rural areas.  
In 2006, farm households have 10,000 CFA francs (16.09 US Dollars) more than non-farm 
households in rural areas and  about 14, 000 CFA (22.54 US Dollars) francs more in urban areas. 
In 2012, income of the farm households has decreased by 26,000 CFA francs (41.83 US Dollars) 
in rural areas and 90,000 CFA francs (144.80 US Dollars) in urban areas. This likely means that  
farm households in urban  have been more affected by the weather shock than households in rural 
areas.  
 
4.3 Impact of the flood of 2010 on enrollment 
The column enrollment of table 3 indicates that enrollment has significantly decreased in 2012 
for children in farm households. 
In terms of age, there is a negative association between enrollment and age six. It means that the 
probability to be enrolled at six years old is negative in the sample. Besides, the probability of 
enrollment is already significant and positive at seven years old and up to 12 years old for 
children in urban areas.  In opposition to rural areas, the probability of enrollment is significant 
and positive at eight years old for girls and nine years old for boys. The estimations suggest that 
there are more late enrollment in rural areas than in urban areas. Especially, boys living in rural 
areas are the last to be enrolled. It is possible that children’s enrollment are delayed in rural areas 
for income or work related issues. 
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The probability of enrollment increases with the level of education of the household head. The 
column on enrollment in table 3 shows that the probability of enrollment is lower of around 28% 
when the household head has no formal education compared to a household head with a higher 
level of education. The probability to be enrolled decreases by 1.50% for girls when the 
household has one more child under five years. This probability is superior to that of boys. It 
suggests that the responsibility of taking care of younger siblings rests more on girls than on 
boys. Concerning biological and fostered children, table 3 shows that the probability of 
enrollment of biological children is higher to that of the fostered children. A girl is 5.82% more 
likely to be enrolled if she is the biological daughter of the household head than if she is a foster 
daughter. 
In 2012, the probability of enrollment in farm households has decreased by 5.99% for girls and 
4.45% for boys in rural areas. Section 4.2 stipulates that the decrease in income is more important 
in urban than in rural areas. Consequently, the decrease in enrollment in urban areas is higher 
than in rural areas. In fact, the probability of enrollment in farm households has reduced by 
7.76% for girls and 6.17% for boys in urban areas.  
The results denote that girls have a higher probability to be held home compared to boys. This 
difference is more important in rural than in urban areas. Interpreting the results, it has to be 
taken into account that according to previous research, the gender differentiated impact of the 
income varies depending on the countries. In Burkina Faso, Grimm (2011) and Kanzianga (2012) 
have found an impact of the income shock more important on boys’s enrollment than girls. 
Björkman-Nyqvist (2013) disclosed in Uganda that when schooling was not free of charge, a 
negative income shock affected both girls and boys. However, when schooling was free of 
charge, an income shock influenced mostly girls. In Benin, school fees were removed in 2006. 
The results indicate that the flood of 2010 affected more girls’ enrollment than boys. The results 
of the present research comply more with Björkman-Nyqvist (2013). Finally, the gender 
dissimilarities are persistent in Benin. 
  
4.4 Impact of the flood of 2010 on child labor 
Concerning child labor, the columns of farm and domestic works show a significant increase in 
the probability to work for children in farm households in 2012. It is necessary to remember that 
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children considered in these estimations are not enrolled in primary schools. In these samples, 
approximately 80% of the household heads have no formal education and 0.77% of the household 
heads have a higher education. In other words, the probability to be a domestic worker or a 
farmer decreases with the household head education.  
Additionally, the column of domestic work displays a positive association between domestic 
work and the age dummies from six to 10 for children in rural areas and six to nine for children in 
urban areas in 2006. Conversely, the column of farm work reveals a significant negative 
association between  farm work and the age dummies from six to nine for every child. After nine 
years old, there is a positive relationship with farm work, but it is not significant. It means that 
children are likely to be domestic workers already at six years old onward, but they are more 
likely to be farm workers over nine years old. In farming, laborers need to ne strong and in good 
physical shape to be able to work. This might disqualify really young children. 
While the probability to be a domestic worker is not significant for children in farm households, 
the probability to be a farmer is significant for children in farm households. The probability to be 
a farmer is only significant and positive for boys in farm households in rural areas, but in urban 
areas in 2006, it is for both boys and girls. After the inundation, the probability to work on a farm 
has increased by 9.04% for girls and 10.06% for boys in rural areas. However, the probability to 
be a domestic worker has increased by 10.5% for girls and 8.68% for boys in rural areas. The 
results imply first that a potential response to the flood of 2010 for households in rural areas was 
to increase child labor especially farm work and domestic work. Despite the shock, cultural 
considerations remain: Boys have a higher likelihood to work on a farm and girls at home in rural 
areas. In urban areas, the probability for boys to be domestic workers has increased by 24.3%. It 
is possible that the damages caused by the inundation on farms are  so important  in urban areas 
that households cannot increase farm work in the short term but other types of work.   
 
4.5 Impact of the flood of 2010 on enrollment and labor 
The columns of enrollment and domestic or farm works of table 3bis present a significant 
increase in these variables in 2012.  
In 2006, the probability to combine enrollment and domestic work is significant and positive for 
girls while significant and negative for boys in farm households in rural areas. It implies that girls 
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are more likely to be enrolled and work at home than boys. In urban areas, this variable is not 
significant. Nevertheless, the probability to combine enrollment and farm work is significant for 
every child in farm households except girls in rural areas. The results imply that cultural 
considerations about girls and boys occupation are predominant in rural areas. 
In 2012, the probability to combine enrollment and domestic work has increased by 9.04% for 
boys in rural areas. In urban areas, the probability to combine enrollment and farm work has 
increased by 6.57% for girls.  
 
In summary, income of the farm households has significantly decreased in 2012. Following the 
shock, the probability of enrollment of children in these households has significantly diminished 
as well. In rural areas, children are more likely to work as domestic laborers or farmers. The 
combination of enrollment and work has also increased. This shows that even for children 
enrolled, the likelihood to do a complementary work, to help the family, has increased. In urban 
areas, domestic work and combination of enrollment and domestic work has significantly 
increased.  
In addition, an endogeneity test confirms that the variable “farm household in 2012” is an 
instrument for household income. In fact, the test does not reject the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity after instrumentation with this variable. 
 
5. Causal impact of income on children’s enrollment  
5.1 The models 
Once the adequate instrument has been determined, the relationship between the household’s 
income and enrollment can be analyzed. The models are: 
First model 
                                                                     (Equation 2) 
 
Second model 
                                                        (Equation 3) 
 
bi and αi are constants; u1 and u2 are residuals. The main dissimilarity between the models above 
is the instrument “treatment*year2012”. The treatment variable is “Farm household”. The 
instrumental variable procedure consists of estimating the endogenous variable in a first model 
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with an instrument and reintroduce the estimated variable in the main regression. The purpose of 
these estimations is to handle the endogeneity bias and reveal the actual effects of income. 
Additionally, the tables presented in this section are the results of two of regressions: an ordinary 
least squares (OLS)  and an instrumental variable with probabilistic regression (IVPROBIT). The 
OLS regressions are a basis to compare and observe the improvement of the models. The 
IVPROBIT models might fit more in the binary form of most of the dependent variables. Still, an 
additional double least square (2SLS) regression will help control the robustness of the results but 
is not presented. 
 
5.2  Household income and schooling 
Expectedly, children’s schooling depends on the household’s income. The OLS and IVPROBIT 
estimations in table 5 show that enrollment increases significantly with the wealth index for girls 
in rural areas. This result is similar for children in urban areas. The influence of income is quite 
low but significant for every group. In the columns of OLS in table 3, the probability of 
enrollment increased by 0.17% for girls and 0.14% for boys with an increase of one point in the 
wealth index  in rural areas. In urban areas, the probability of enrollment increased with 
household income of 0.05% for girls and 0.08% for boys. The result implies a less strong 
influence of income on child’s schooling in urban areas. It also shows that income has more 
impact on the decision to school girls than boys in rural areas. However, with the IVPROBIT 
estimations, the impact of income on children’s enrollment is higher. Girls enrollment increase by 
0.26%, while boys enrollment increases by 0.22% with a one point increase in the wealth index.  
 
Table 3: Instrumental variable regressions of girls’ enrollment for the period 2006-2012 
[Table 3 here] 
In conclusion, Benin has launched in 2006, a program of removal of school fees for every child 
in primary schools. Despite the removal of fees, the household’s income still determines the 
probability to be enrolled in primary school. The impact is stronger for girls than boys in rural 
areas. This explains that parents chose to withdraw their children from school and increase child 
labor after the flood of 2010.  
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6. Robustness check 
The purpose of this section is first to check whether the results are consistent when using other 
groups of households potentially affected by the flood of 2010. The main assumption is that the 
classification in GFDRR (2011) is accurate. In that case, though the mere categorization of 
affected areas might not yield enough variations in the household income, it is possible to 
account for additional variations between farm households. A plausible dissimilarity could exist 
between farm and non-farm households in the affected municipalities or in the most affected 
municipalities. The expectations are that the impact of the inundation on these subgroups should 
be similar to the impacts observed in the main evaluation. These variations would thus reveal the 
consistency of the results across groups. Second,  a placebo experiment on non farm and non-
affected households would be run. This last experience should evidence any other treatment that 
could influence the groups other than the flood of 2010. 
 
6.1 Impact of flooding on the affected farm households  
Equation 1 has been estimated on a sample of households “affected” by the shock. The 
treatment is still “ farm household in 2012”. The difference with the main evaluation is that the 
samples have been reduced to households whose children were born in an affected municipality. 
Two points are important. First, the new samples take into consideration the classification 
between affected and non-affected municipalities. Second, this restriction of the samples helps 
control for migration as well. As a remainder of section 3, the place of birth is the current place of 
residence for 90% of children. To avoid a potential migration effect, the municipality of birth is 
used to create the variable “affected”, instead of the current place of residence. The following 
table shows the characteristics of the affected farm households. 
Table 4: Linear regression of outcomes and income for farm households in the affected municipalities from 2006 to 
2012 
[Table 4 here] 
The columns of the wealth index in table 4 present a significant decrease by 28,000 CFA francs 
(45.09 US Dollars) in rural areas and 108,000 CFA francs (173.76 US Dollars) in urban areas for 
farm households in 2012. This decrease in income is more important for the affected farm 
households than for the farm households in general. Instead of the reduction by 26,000 CFA 
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francs (41.83 US Dollars) for a farm households in rural areas, the diminution is about 28,000 
CFA francs (45.09 US Dollars) for an affected farm households in the same area.  
The probability of enrollment has also significantly decreased for every child. This likelihood 
has reduced by 7.63% for girls and 4.71% for boys in affected farm households in rural areas. 
The probability to be enrolled has diminished by 11.5% for girls and 6.20% for boys in urban 
areas. This suggests that girls’ enrollment has been more influenced by the flood of 2010 than 
boys’. 
Besides, the likelihood of working has increased significantly in affected farm households  in 
2012. The probability of being a domestic worker has increased by 9.87% for girls in rural areas 
and 21.9% for boys in urban areas. The probability to be a farmer has increased by 9.72% for 
girls in rural areas, by 8.78% for girls in urban areas and by 11.3% for boys in rural areas. The 
probability to combine enrollment and farm work has increased by 6.69% for girls in rural areas 
and by 9.39% for girls in urban areas.  
The instrumental variable estimations in table 5 are based on equations 2 and 3 with the new 
samples. The results confirm that household income has a significant impact on children’s 
enrollment.  The IVPROBIT columns of table 5 indicate that enrollment increased by 0.29% for 
girls in rural areas, by 0.22% for boys in rural areas. The statistics are lower for children in urban 
areas. Still, household income influences more girls than boys in rural areas.  
 
Table 5: Instrumental variable regressions of  enrollment for farm households in the affected municipalities from 
2006 to 2012 
[Table 5 here] 
In summary, the flood of 2010 has similar and even worse impacts on affected farm households 
than on farm households in the main evaluation. Income and enrollment have decreased, but child 
labor has increased. The results are thus consistent for affected farm households.   
 
6.2 Impact of the flooding on the most affected farm households 
Another variation may exist between the most affected farm households and most affected non-
farm households. A second classification of  farm households is considered in this experiment. 
The treatment group is the farm households whose children were born in the most affected 
municipalities. The sample for this subgroup is limited to the most affected municipalities. This  
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limitation controls for migration effect as well. Equation 1 is run on the most affected 
municipalities. Table 6 presents the results of these estimations.   
 
Table 6: Linear regression of outcomes and income for farm households living in the most affected municipalities 
from 2006 to 2012 
[Table 6 here] 
Mainly, income has significantly decreased for the most affected farm households. Income was  
reduced by 27,000 CFA francs for rural areas and 102,000 CFA francs for urban areas. With the 
decrease of income, the probability of enrollment has diminished by 7.69% for girls and 6.80% 
for boys in rural areas. This probability is higher in urban areas. In the column of farm work, the 
probability to be a farm worker has significantly increased by 11% for girls in rural areas. 
Enrollment and farm work has also significantly increased by 9.10% for girls in rural areas and 
by 13.7% for girls in urban areas. There is no significant impact on domestic or farm work for 
boys. An explanation is that boys might work in paid jobs rather than unpaid jobs. Domestic and 
farm labors are likely to be unpaid jobs, because the children work in the households or in the 
family business. Given the importance of the income loss, some parents might send their children 
to paid jobs for that will yield more money.  In addition, the instrumental variable equations 
estimated with the sub-samples of the most affected households reveal similar results to the main 
evaluation. 
 
Table 7: Instrumental variable regressions of  enrollment for farm households in the most affected municipalities 
from 2006 to 2012 
[Table 7 here] 
In the IVPROBIT columns of table 7, the probability of enrollment increases by approximately 
0.29% for children in rural areas with the increase of one point in wealth index. In conclusion, the 
impact of the flood of 2010 is alike on the affected and most affected farm households. The 
experiments in section 6.1 and 6.2 confirm that the results are consistent across different groups 
in the country.  
 
6.3 Impact of flooding on non-affected and non-farm households 
The third subgroup to observe is a placebo experiment. The samples for this estimation are non-
farm households whose children are not born in any affected municipality. Once the sample is 
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retained, the method used is the simple difference before and after the shock. The linear 
regressions of the wealth index in table 8 presents no significant modification in household 
income in 2012. The main remark is that the wealth index has not significantly changed either in 
rural nor in urban areas. 
Table 8: Linear regression of income for non-affected and non- farm households living from 2006 to 2012 
[Table 8] 
Table 9: Linear regression of outcomes for non-affected and non-farm households from 2006 to 2012 
[Table 9] 
In all the columns of table 9 as well, there is no significant change in any children’s outcome in 
2012. Enrollment and child labor have not significantly changed for non-affected and non-farm 
households after the flood of 2010. There is no evidence of any other shocks on the household 
income during the same period. Thus the impacts observed in the main evaluation on households 
are essentially the impacts of the inundation. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The present study investigated households’ decisions on schooling and child labor under the 
constraint of an income shock. A removal of school fees has been implemented in Benin since 
2006. The aim of this paper is to determine the coping strategies of the households under an 
income shock in this particular setting. The income shock considered is the flood of 2010, that 
caused numerous damages in Benin. 
The results point to a reduction in income for farm households compared to non-farm 
households either in urban or in rural areas. With the decrease in income, the probability of 
enrollment has decreased more for girls than boys. A diminution of income of 26,000 CFA francs 
(41.83 US Dollars) in rural areas led to a decrease in enrollment of 5.99% for girls and 4.45% for 
boys in farm households. The likelihood to work as a farmer or a domestic laborer has increased. 
Indeed, the likelihood to be a domestic laborer has increased by 9.04% for girls and 10.06% for 
boys in rural areas and to be farmer has increased by 10.5% for girls and 8.68% for boys in the 
same areas. Despite the increase in child labor after the flood of 2010, regardless of gender, the 
cultural considerations seem to be persistent in rural areas. Thus, under the income shock, 
households choose to diversify their reactions. Although, there are no school fees to be paid for 
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enrollment, children were held in their households and send to work in response to the decrease 
in income. The instrumental variable estimates indicate an elasticity income of 0.17% for girls 
and 0.14% for boys in rural areas with a one point increase in the wealth index. The outcomes are 
roughly similar in urban areas. The results were further controlled with additional groups based 
on the categorization between affected and most affected municipalities. These robustness checks 
confirmed the previous results. The impacts of the flood of 2010 were even worse on these 
subgroups than on the groups considered for the main evaluation. An additional placebo 
experiment shows that the impacts observed were not the consequences of other shocks than the 
inundation. Indeed, there was no significant change in income for non-farm and non-affected 
households after the flood of 2010. 
Seemingly, the results suggest that the income effect prevails over the price effect in Benin. In 
fact, although there were no school fees to pay, the households’ reactions to the negative income 
shock, were to hold their children home. These findings might disclose that a reduction or 
elimination of school fees cannot serve as a safety net under an income shock in Benin. Except 
the direct school cost which are school fees, there is the opportunity cost of the child spending 
time at school instead of working for his parents. In times of crisis, this opportunity cost rises and 
it becomes more difficult for parents to maintain their children in school.  
National and  international efforts to school children and reach the universal primary education 
could be at risk with income shocks. It could be difficult to acquire skills when the schooling is 
interrupted each time there is a weather shock. In addition to the removal of school fees, the main 
recommendation is to give subsidies to parents to maintain their children in school especially in 
case of shocks.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Statistics of different treatment groups after matching 
Experiment 1: Children born in an affected 
municipality 
Year 2006 Year 2012 Total Frequency (%) 
  
Yes 
No 
14,793  
7,808      
14,805       
8,085 
29,598 
15,893 
65.06 
34.94 
Experiment 2: Children born in a most affected 
municipality 
Year 2006 Year 2012 Total Frequency (%) 
  
Yes 
No 
8,497 
14,104 
8,699 
14,191 
17,196 
28,295 
37.80 
62.20 
Experiment 3: Children born in a household that owns 
agricultural land 
Year 2006 Year 2012 Total Frequency  (%) 
Yes 
No 
15,096 
7,463  
14,816 
8,074 
29,912 
15,537 
65.81 
34.18 
Source: Author’s computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Linear regression of outcomes and income for children in rural areas for the period 2006-2012 with the 
experiment 3 
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 Girls in rural areas Boys in rural areas 
VARIABLES Enrollment Domestic 
work 
Farm or 
family 
work 
Wealth Enrollment Domestic 
work 
Farm or 
family 
work 
Wealth 
Househ. head  no 
formal educ. 
-0.283*** -0.154*** 0.191*** -64.53*** -0.268*** -0.126** 0.135** -58.98*** 
 (0.0238) (0.0584) (0.0522) (5.819) (0.0207) (0.0494) (0.0538) (5.259) 
Househ. head  no 
formal educ.  in 2012 
0.0536* 0.0534 -0.217*** 5.431 0.0621** 0.137* 0.00114 2.499 
 (0.0292) (0.0745) (0.0729) (6.477) (0.0277) (0.0815) (0.0650) (6.093) 
Househ. head  prim. 
educ. 
-0.125*** -0.0643 0.0889 -44.88*** -0.0956*** -0.0397 0.0657 -40.63*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0648) (0.0585) (5.735) (0.0215) (0.0567) (0.0620) (5.253) 
Househ. head  prim. 
educ.  in 2012 
0.0581* 0.0756 -0.0490 10.20 0.0537* 0.0763 0.0592 11.07* 
 (0.0320) (0.0840) (0.0828) (6.783) (0.0282) (0.0898) (0.0745) (6.513) 
Numb. Children under 
5 years old 
-0.0150*** 0.000215 0.00294 1.976* 0.0385** -0.00832 0.0138** 2.462** 
 (0.00550) (0.00840) (0.00826) (1.037) (0.0176) (0.00543) (0.00689) (1.121) 
Numb. Children under 
5 years old in  2012 
-0.00166 -0.00693 -0.00456 -1.801 -0.00140 0.00223 -0.00724 -2.304* 
 (0.00800) (0.0117) (0.0112) (1.237) (0.0242) (0.00974) (0.0107) (1.249) 
Dummy for son or 
daughter 
0.0582*** -0.0375 0.0757*** -11.42*** -0.0172*** 8.88e-06 0.00524 -6.146** 
 (0.0181) (0.0250) (0.0259) (2.201) (0.00510) (0.0206) (0.0268) (2.702) 
Dummy for son or 
daughter in 2012 
-0.0182 -0.00941 -0.0701** 6.311** 0.000626 0.0115 0.00544 4.712 
 (0.0243) (0.0357) (0.0345) (2.984) (0.00681) (0.0309) (0.0359) (3.109) 
2012 dummy 0.0912 0.187* -0.0948 0.397 -0.0278 0.149 -0.609*** 11.81 
 (0.0558) (0.106) (0.0915) (8.389) (0.0528) (0.109) (0.100) (8.609) 
Farm household 0.0364** -0.00522 0.0348 10.01*** -0.0263 -0.0170 0.0728** 9.723*** 
 (0.0168) (0.0298) (0.0307) (1.924) (0.0166) (0.0217) (0.0303) (1.736) 
Farm household in 
2012 
-0.0599*** 0.105*** 0.0904** -25.51*** -0.0445* 0.0868** 0.106*** -26.68*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0403) (0.0389) (3.424) (0.0236) (0.0370) (0.0380) (3.221) 
Constant 0.623*** 0.424*** 0.292*** 4.931 0.747*** 0.124* 0.639*** -14.58** 
 (0.0416) (0.0770) (0.0710) (7.815) (0.0396) (0.0667) (0.0775) (6.897) 
         
Observations 14,206 5,226 5,226 14,221 15,506 4,460 4,460 15,532 
R-squared 0.138 0.138 0.138 0.178 0.136 0.147 0.335 0.160 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering across households in the same primary sampling unit 
(PSU). The equations include dummies for the child’s age and district dummies that are not presented. *** 
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 bis: Linear regression of outcomes and income for children in rural areas for the period 2006-2012 with the 
experiment 3 
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 Girls in rural areas Boys in rural areas 
VARIABLES Enrollment 
and domestic 
work 
Enrollment 
and farm work 
Wealth Enrollment and 
domestic work 
Enrollment and 
farm work 
Wealth 
Househ. head  no 
formal educ. 
-0.0784** 0.148*** -64.53*** -0.121*** 0.187*** -58.98*** 
 (0.0326) (0.0346) (5.819) (0.0277) (0.0334) (5.259) 
Househ. head  no 
formal educ.  in 2012 
0.0101 -0.120*** 5.431 0.0934** -0.149*** 2.499 
 (0.0444) (0.0370) (6.477) (0.0415) (0.0380) (6.093) 
Househ. head  prim. 
educ. 
0.0195 0.0418 -44.88*** -0.0804*** 0.132*** -40.63*** 
 (0.0360) (0.0346) (5.735) (0.0294) (0.0352) (5.253) 
Househ. head  prim. 
educ.  in 2012 
-0.00777 -0.00815 10.20 0.144*** -0.0875** 11.07* 
 (0.0494) (0.0388) (6.783) (0.0437) (0.0406) (6.513) 
Numb. Children under 
5 years old 
-0.00394 0.0134 1.976* -0.0108* 0.0191** 2.462** 
 (0.00824) (0.00846) (1.037) (0.00585) (0.00761) (1.121) 
Numb. Children under 
5 years old in  2012 
-0.00409 -0.0125 -1.801 0.00447 -0.0131 -2.304* 
 (0.0117) (0.00927) (1.237) (0.00929) (0.00918) (1.249) 
Dummy for son or 
daughter 
-0.0820*** 0.0904*** -11.42*** -0.0296 0.0461* -6.146** 
 (0.0248) (0.0225) (2.201) (0.0212) (0.0263) (2.702) 
Dummy for son or 
daughter in 2012 
0.0724** -0.0791** 6.311** 0.0449 0.00336 4.712 
 (0.0352) (0.0306) (2.984) (0.0293) (0.0332) (3.109) 
2012 dummy 0.114 -0.104 0.397 0.0998 -0.317*** 11.81 
 (0.0857) (0.0764) (8.389) (0.0740) (0.0739) (8.609) 
Farm household 0.0516** 0.0351 10.01*** -0.0352* 0.125*** 9.723*** 
 (0.0245) (0.0238) (1.924) (0.0189) (0.0243) (1.736) 
Farm household in 
2012 
-0.0109 0.0496 -25.51*** 0.0904*** -0.00651 -26.68*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0302) (3.424) (0.0277) (0.0297) (3.221) 
Constant 0.511*** 0.138** 4.931 0.402*** 0.337*** -14.58** 
 (0.0670) (0.0640) (7.815) (0.0503) (0.0643) (6.897) 
       
Observations 8,145 7,210 14,221 10,120 8,839 15,532 
R-squared 0.075 0.120 0.178 0.130 0.259 0.160 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering across households in the same primary sampling unit 
(PSU). The equations include dummies for the child’s age and district dummies that are not presented. *** 
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Instrumental variable regressions of  enrollment from 2006 to 2012 
 Girls in rural areas  Boys in rural areas  
VARIABLES OLS OLS IVPROBI IVPROBIT OLS OLS IVPROBIT IVPROBIT 
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T 
         
Wealth 
index/1000 
0.00174*** 0.00166*** 0.0110*** 0.00783*** 0.00163*** 0.00147*** 0.00679*** 0.00701*** 
 (0.000121) (0.000108) (0.00192) (0.00239) (0.000107) (0.000106) (0.00254) (0.00266) 
Househ. head  
no formal educ. 
-0.183*** -0.176*** -0.0925 -0.359** -0.179*** -0.183*** -0.499*** -0.536*** 
 (0.0249) (0.0235) (0.175) (0.183) (0.0210) (0.0196) (0.164) (0.174) 
Househ. head  
no formal educ.  
in 2012 
0.00486 0.0445 -0.114 0.0181 0.0360 0.0601** 0.00542 0.103 
 (0.0299) (0.0283) (0.109) (0.108) (0.0266) (0.0266) (0.113) (0.117) 
Househ. head  
prim. educ. 
-0.0482* -0.0506** 0.0995 -0.0806 -0.0333 -0.0385* -0.129 -0.138 
 (0.0268) (0.0257) (0.130) (0.140) (0.0224) (0.0200) (0.125) (0.129) 
Househ. head  
prim. educ.  in 
2012 
0.0209 0.0407 -0.0450 0.0629 0.0355 0.0398 0.0838 0.0926 
 (0.0327) (0.0312) (0.117) (0.119) (0.0284) (0.0271) (0.123) (0.125) 
2012 dummy 0.125*** 0.0834 0.502*** 0.318* 0.0717*** -0.0474 0.312*** -0.106 
 (0.0277) (0.0559) (0.107) (0.174) (0.0236) (0.0508) (0.109) (0.174) 
Farm household -0.00844 0.0116 -0.00244 0.0320 -0.0470*** -0.0441*** -0.144*** -0.138*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0121) (0.0361) (0.0351) (0.0126) (0.0124) (0.0372) (0.0383) 
Farm household 
in 2012 
  IV IV   IV IV 
         
Constant 0.730*** 0.618*** 0.534*** 0.374*** 0.844*** 0.767*** 1.077*** 0.915*** 
 (0.0250) (0.0423) (0.107) (0.130) (0.0191) (0.0376) (0.0774) (0.122) 
         
Observations 14,220 14,206 14,220 14,206 15,520 15,506 15,520 15,506 
R-squared 0.089 0.167   0.082 0.159   
Other covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering across households in the same primary sampling unit 
(PSU). The equations include dummies for the child’s age, the household head’s gender, number of household 
members, number of children under five years old in the household, districts dummies. *** Significant at 1%, ** 
Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Linear regression of outcomes and income for farm households living in the affected municipalities from 
2006 to 2012  
 Girls in rural Boys in rural 
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VARIABLES Enrollment Domestic 
work 
Farm work Wealth Enrollment Domestic 
work 
Farm 
work 
Wealth 
2012 dummy 0.166** 0.247* -0.167 -3.371 -0.0374 0.206 -0.541*** 2.174 
 (0.0655) (0.135) (0.113) (10.70) (0.0598) (0.142) (0.124) (10.38) 
Affect. farm 
househ.  0.0376* 0.00845 0.0306 10.31*** -0.00423 -0.0226 0.0606 11.24*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0322) (0.0310) (2.282) (0.0191) (0.0267) (0.0374) (2.014) 
Affect. farm 
househ. in 2012 -0.0763*** 0.0987* 0.0972** -28.17*** -0.0471* 0.0484 0.113** -28.91*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0505) (0.0446) (4.163) (0.0279) (0.0524) (0.0506) (4.260) 
Constant 0.604*** 0.430*** 0.277*** 7.200 0.791*** 0.172** 0.591*** -12.43 
 (0.0503) (0.0936) (0.0865) (9.766) (0.0442) (0.0833) (0.0901) (8.522) 
         
Observations 9,109 3,326 3,326 9,120 9,899 2,813 2,813 9,915 
R-squared 0.157 0.142 0.160 0.188 0.188 0.142 0.348 0.172 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering across households in the same primary sampling unit 
(PSU). The equations include dummies for the child’s age, the household head’s age, the household head’ gender. 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
Table 5: Instrumental variable regressions of  enrollment for farm households in the affected municipalities from 
2006 to 2012 
 Girls in rural areas  Boys in rural areas  
VARIABLES OLS OLS IVPROBIT IVPROBIT OLS OLS IVPROBIT IVPROBIT 
         
Wealth 
index/1000 
0.00172*** 0.00158*** 0.0109*** 0.00902*** 0.00160*** 0.00130*** 0.00901*** 0.00754** 
 (0.000150) (0.000131) (0.00214) (0.00264) (0.000138) (0.000115) (0.00278) (0.00313) 
2012 dummy 0.132*** 0.158** 0.548*** 0.569*** 0.0634** -0.0448 0.317** -0.132 
 (0.0325) (0.0658) (0.124) (0.209) (0.0260) (0.0591) (0.127) (0.214) 
Affect. farm 
househ.  
-0.0151 0.00655 -0.0119 0.0202 -0.0575*** -0.0232* -0.173*** -0.0799* 
 (0.0167) (0.0145) (0.0454) (0.0425) (0.0158) (0.0135) (0.0465) (0.0447) 
Affect. farm 
househ. in 2012 
  IV IV   IV IV 
Constant 0.728*** 0.599*** 0.507*** 0.291* 0.865*** 0.810*** 1.125*** 1.079*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0518) (0.125) (0.165) (0.0215) (0.0429) (0.102) (0.147) 
         
Observations 9,119 9,109 9,119 9,109 9,906 9,899 9,906 9,899 
R-squared 0.091 0.182   0.086 0.206   
Other covariates  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering across households in the same primary sampling unit 
(PSU). The equations include dummies for the child’s age, the household head’s gender, the household’s head level 
of education, number of household members, number of children under five years old in the household and districts 
dummies. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
 
 
Table 6: Linear regression of outcomes and income for farm households living in the most affected municipalities 
from 2006 to 2012  
 Girls in rural Boys in rural 
VARIABLES Enrollment Domestic Farm work Wealth Enrollment Domestic Farm Wealth 
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work work work 
2012 dummy 0.0982 0.319** -0.142 -2.455 -0.0933 0.199 -0.469*** -4.567 
 (0.0896) (0.159) (0.131) (12.85) (0.0626) (0.151) (0.137) (13.19) 
Most affect. farm 
househ.  
0.0295 0.0245 0.00429 14.91*** -0.0258 -0.0670** 0.166*** 12.07*** 
 (0.0257) (0.0403) (0.0414) (2.840) (0.0253) (0.0300) (0.0464) (2.458) 
Most affect. farm 
househ. in 2012 
-0.0769** 0.0488 0.110* -27.51*** -0.0680* 0.0996 0.00479 -21.25*** 
 (0.0387) (0.0680) (0.0624) (5.007) (0.0376) (0.0662) (0.0614) (4.771) 
Constant 0.574*** 0.440*** 0.339*** -4.451 0.808*** 0.196** 0.579*** -14.82 
 (0.0673) (0.101) (0.0964) (10.61) (0.0471) (0.0889) (0.111) (10.12) 
         
Observations 5,272 1,955 1,955 5,279 5,900 1,801 1,801 5,899 
R-squared 0.140 0.166 0.191 0.194 0.179 0.134 0.345 0.172 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering across households in the same primary sampling unit 
(PSU). The equations include dummies for the child’s age, the household head’s age, the household head’ gender. 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
Table 7: Instrumental variable regressions of  enrollment for farm households in the most affected municipalities 
from 2006 to 2012 
 Girls in rural areas  Boys in rural areas  
VARIABLES OLS OLS IVPROBIT IVPROBIT OLS OLS IVPROBIT IVPROBIT 
         
Wealth 
index/1000 
0.00181*** 0.00182*** 0.00952*** 0.00896** 0.00191*** 0.00173*** 0.0108** 0.0129*** 
 (0.000187) (0.000168) (0.00283) (0.00362) (0.000187) (0.000144) (0.00443) (0.00434) 
year2012 0.145*** 0.0903 0.574*** 0.400 0.0829** -0.100 0.398** -0.174 
 (0.0424) (0.0891) (0.158) (0.280) (0.0381) (0.0610) (0.186) (0.254) 
Most affect. farm 
househ.  
-0.0114 -0.00897 -0.0359 -0.0382 -0.0749*** -0.0594*** -0.239*** -0.200*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0208) (0.0588) (0.0627) (0.0199) (0.0186) (0.0590) (0.0589) 
Most affect. farm 
househ. in 2012 
  IV IV   IV IV 
Constant 0.715*** 0.586*** 0.539*** 0.273 0.856*** 0.815*** 1.072*** 0.990*** 
 (0.0376) (0.0677) (0.134) (0.206) (0.0283) (0.0441) (0.141) (0.192) 
         
Observations 5,279 5,272 5,279 5,272 5,900 5,900 5,900 5,900 
R-squared 0.094 0.171   0.095 0.209   
Other covariates  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering across households in the same primary sampling unit 
(PSU). The equations include dummies for the child’s age, the household head’s gender, the household’s head level 
of education, number of household members, number of children under five years old in the household, districts 
dummies. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
 
Table 8: Linear regression of income for non farm households living in non affected municipalities from 2006 to 
2012  
 Wealth index 
VARIABLES Girls in 
rural areas 
Girls in 
urban areas 
Boys in 
rural areas 
Boys in 
urban areas 
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Househ. head  no formal educ. -56.38*** -114.3*** -47.71*** -99.92*** 
 (15.84) (14.34) (12.69) (14.24) 
Househ. head  no formal educ.  
in 2012 
-14.55 6.300 -40.74** -11.04 
 (19.24) (17.14) (18.66) (19.37) 
Househ. head  prim. educ. -33.87** -77.95*** -31.97** -58.25*** 
 (15.66) (15.72) (12.69) (14.05) 
Househ. head  prim. educ.  in 
2012 
2.272 28.81 -19.78 13.97 
 (19.42) (18.74) (18.89) (18.31) 
2012 dummy 21.78 23.95 32.29 0.659 
 (20.68) (19.09) (19.67) (27.61) 
Constant 14.90 135.7*** -1.701 121.6*** 
 (13.41) (17.87) (15.42) (18.72) 
     
Observations 1,473 1,091 1,544 1,026 
R-squared 0.250 0.372 0.289 0.358 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering across households in the same primary sampling unit 
(PSU). The equations include dummies for the child’s age, the household head’s age, the household head’ gender, 
district dummies, number of children under five years old in the households and the relationship with the head. *** 
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
Table 9: Linear regression of income for non farm households living in non affected municipalities from 2006 to 
2012  
 Girls in rural Boys in rural 
VARIABLES Enrollment Domestic 
work 
Farm 
work 
Wealth Enrollment Domest
ic work 
Farm 
work 
Wealth 
Househ. head  no 
formal educ. 
-0.223*** 0.0970 0.150 -56.38*** -0.237*** -0.183 0.256 -47.71*** 
 (0.0645) (0.142) (0.111) (15.84) (0.0556) (0.199) (0.227) (12.69) 
Househ. head  no 
formal educ.  in 2012 
-0.102 -0.300 -0.390 -14.55 0.0689 0.239 -0.174 -40.74** 
 (0.0748) (0.276) (0.262) (19.24) (0.0835) (0.226) (0.228) (18.66) 
Househ. head  prim. 
educ. 
-0.139* 0.310** -0.0363 -33.87** -0.104* -0.117 0.245 -31.97** 
 (0.0708) (0.147) (0.116) (15.66) (0.0560) (0.229) (0.232) (12.69) 
Househ. head  prim. 
educ.  in 2012 
-0.0565 -0.344 -0.137 2.272 0.104 0.225 -0.0940 -19.78 
 (0.0838) (0.289) (0.261) (19.42) (0.0819) (0.251) (0.246) (18.89) 
2012 dummy 0.0543 0.255 0.0943 21.78 -0.0770 -0.0721 -0.390 32.29 
 (0.157) (0.280) (0.270) (20.68) (0.102) (0.229) (0.265) (19.67) 
Constant 0.686*** 0.308** 0.295*** 14.90 0.996*** 0.218 0.408 -1.701 
 (0.107) (0.150) (0.108) (13.41) (0.0690) (0.197) (0.257) (15.42) 
         
Observations 1,470 514 514 1,473 1,541 394 394 1,544 
R-squared 0.158 0.233 0.168 0.250 0.192 0.174 0.373 0.289 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering across households in the same primary sampling unit 
(PSU). The equations include dummies for the child’s age, the household head’s age, the household head’ gender, 
district dummies, number of children under five years old in the households and the relationship with the the 
head.*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
